True story of U.S sponsored Chechen terrorist ties to 9/11
Preview
Hawk of Pandora Vol II; Anatomy of a False Flag Terrorist Act
The Trollville Shadow Network
Vol II The Suicide Bomber Candidate: Why?
Trollville Everywhere; Myth of Evil vs Human Spirit
The Trollville Shadow Network

“Villains have no borders because they know no boundaries.”



     At a time of conflict and war hungry profiteers efforts to intimidate war by false means, it becomes an easy convenience for the corrupt elite that have financial or power hungry motives to exploit those who play stupid and reckless roles and acts on their behalf like the Trollville clique and group did with their role in being catalysts to the development of the 'Norwegian home grown' (false flag) terrorist cell. Social environments and the shady patrons within it are the foundations for which allow the corrupt elite to exploit for their agendas and get away with it. 

     There were only a few locals who sold narcotics and other illegal contraband in Trollville that I knew of; some of these originally from South America and some local Norwegians. All of them were either from or had some association to the clique and the group. Most of the other ethnic South Americans had nothing to do with drugs trafficking or sales at all and adjusted well causing no problems. They were just interested in building their lives like most other people and naturally turned a blind eye to some of their fellow South American expats. However, even normal people can get caught in the web and weren’t eager to support any form of action to deter their fellow neighbors or town citizens from drug abuse or trafficking. I was fortunate to work with a few of the good guys, and they were the best of colleagues. Unfortunately, it only takes a few to make a bad name for many.

In any town or city, drug dealers and traffickers are always integrated, and especially in small towns where they all know each other. Since most of the narcotics to Trollville came in from or through the closest town (I’ll name as) Amville, they obviously had ties to the main traffickers controlled by the small Albanian, Chechen and other East European and Baltic networks in Amville, Fjordville and Skiville located few hours from each other. They were initially responsible for most of the drug distribution throughout the local region and had a close connection to the bigger networks in the cities that were naturally responsible for trafficking larger amounts into the country. The trafficking usually went by bus or train. The bus to Amville or trains to Bergen were the apparent routes. Oslo central train station is the major hub where much of the drug deals happen. It almost seems to be like an open market where ‘fresh drugs’ are openly available. It is so blatantly condensed and visible that even tourists notice. Walking around, inside and outside the train station, the Russians and Albanians even seem to openly operate without interference. You can easily notice eastern European groups with their handlers. Especially groups of women that are being trafficked around! Many of these women are used as mules mostly by intimidation to traffic the drugs from the Balkans or Russia to the Baltics and then through Sweden, Germany, Denmark and Holland by boat, bus, car or train and is cut for distribution to be further sold onto the smaller markets around the country. The bus routes seemed to be the least monitored with the exception of the visible major bus stations in the cities where I have noticed undercover officers monitoring suspected traffickers. It was also easy to tell who they were monitoring as well. They were Eastern European and Balkan (Albanian) traffickers. However, there was still quite a variety of ethnic traffickers being monitored. North African and Latin American cocaine networks have also expanded their reach to Norway which is commonly controlled by Albanians and N’drangcheta, the Italian organized crime cartel who were known to have cooperative relationships with Colombian cartels and FARC. Both N’drangcheta and Chechens operate in “flat type” structure recruitment and are confined to small clans of young and violent men in small towns, much like the small violent Chechen clique in Amville.[1]
Albanians, Chechens and
N’drangcheta have established partnerships with Colombian cocaine cartels and FARC.
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The Clique and the Colombian

In 2002, while at a friend’s place standing on the balcony, a new neighbor had moved in across the street. The first day we noticed him, he was on the second floor and for no reason at all he opened the window and started shouting aloud and cursing at us, “vete a la mierda de cerdo Americano. Hijo de puta Americano. Americano cerdo” or “Fuck you American pig! American bastard! American pig!”

He had Hispanic features. Somewhere from Latin America! The cursing and pig comment gave him away.  Criminal's, especially latino's, favorite for cops “pigs” used with contempt. Neither my friend nor I could understand why he shouted and cursed at us except for the fact that he was really upset at something. Actually irate! Hell, I never even got a chance to piss him off correctly! He even came out into the middle of the street just to bitch me out. It was the first time I had ever seen this guy until he exploded through the open window and came out to the street. Yet he was angry as if he thought he knew who I was. I couldn’t help wonder why the hell this guy came out of nowhere being so upset. Again local clique had been instigating this guy into a frenzy to believe that I was American law enforcement. He was clearly spooked about American law enforcement or perhaps the FBI. I started checking and asked around about the new guy. A few locals told me he was a Colombian that came in from Holland! This was an uncanny coincidence considering that I had come from Atlanta with my anti crime background. I could not afford not to run a check on this guy. I have been lucky several times before with Interpol’s search sites, so the first thing I did was run a check through Interpol warrants. I searched for warrants on Colombians. There must have been hundreds of warrants on Colombians for various crimes. I came up with a warrant of a guy that had an uncanny accurate match. The frantic Colombian neighbor had a Dutch name on the mail box. The guy on the warrant spoke fluent Dutch which indicated that the suspect had spent time in Holland or the Dutch Antilles in the Caribbean. The Dutch Antilles is known as a hub for Colombian trafficking routes to Europe especially Holland. Trafficking routes by organizations connected to FARC.

In the fall of 2000, A local and federal Task Force in Atlanta made a major cocaine bust of three metric tons at a warehouse complex. This cocaine shipment had come through several stages through the Caribbean from Colombia. I was there when it happened because one of the Chechen suspects were spotted in the area. I was not a part of the arresting task force. The group behind the cocaine shipment were operating on behalf of Mexican Gulf cartels in collaboration with the Colombians. The Chechens were suspected of coming in from Mexico.

The warrant against the wanted Colombian came from the Southern District Attorney’s office of New York with charges of “drugs related crimes conspiracy.” The warrant also stated that he was from a central area of Colombia. This particular area was under complete control by the FARC Middle Magdalena 4th Front district (narko) terrorist group. FARC has been directly involved with both production and trafficking of cocaine. This clearly indicated that he was either a member or he was trafficking on behalf of FARC. This would certainly clarify the local Colombians abrupt and out of the blue rage. After a few weeks of information collecting and observing this guy, he had already made a scary impression to others in town, especially the women. Several of the local women had complained that he had made scary advances with the attempt to marry them.

One day while he was doing something (reorganizing?) out of his van, I noticed him stacking at least half a dozen different license plates (all European and several Norwegian) on the backside of the van that he stored in the garage. The Colombian would usually park his van in front of his garage directly across from my friend’s apartment so the view was very clear. Having more than one license plate is illegal in this country, and strict government regulations insure that you only get one for each vehicle. If you change the plates you have to deliver the old one back.

The thought of coincidence faded when taken into account that this guy was already tipped off of who I was by locals. From his abrupt and out of the blue blow out, it didn’t take a genius to figure out that the Colombian guy had help from the few locals involved with drug trafficking. The group’s connections to an aid of Sarkis Soghanalian who sold arms to FARC brought this connection too far beyond any account of coincidence. Their association to the original house owner that rented the place to the Colombian was also closely associated to a member of a socialist political youth movement that was alleged to have had political interests and contacts with FARC.

Members of political youth organizations in Norway have been known to naively and openly raise financial support for organizations officially listed as terrorist groups such as PFLP, Hamas and Hezbollah.

Socialist Youth of Norway’s Socialist Party had sponsored a summer camp to collect funds to support the Popular Front for Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) which is listed as a terrorist group under U.S. and EU watch lists.[2] PFLP has had a long history of active terrorist activities ranging from numerous airplane hijackings, airline bombings and suicide bombings. Most victims were normal civilians.

Officially during the war in Lebanon 2006, one of Norway's socialist parties had made a clear policy not to support Hezbollah as long as they targeted civilians, but endorsed support for military targets.

Each of the local and distinct connections from the group to a few South Americans, the landlord- the Colombian rented the house from- a local leftwing political member of a socialist youth organization that, according to the Colombian newspaper Semana based on emails retrieved from the computer of a FARC leader, was tied to FARC, all were closely associated by the “group” of friends within the clique including the Halliburton employee that were in contact with the Colombian.

One crystal clear and universal fact about political organizations whether from far left or far right is that most if not all has some form of corrupt connection to armed militant groups (often designated as terrorists) that they exploit for political purposes behind the curtain to further their ‘legitimate goals’ against oppositions. Norwegian political organizations are no exception.

There were too many coincidences among these integrated connections to be accidental. In the field of intelligence and law enforcement there is a common rule called the “rule of three”. Any (close or collaborating) coincidences that exceeds three is no longer regarded as a coincidence. 

That same summer, while at work, an unknown person had thrown a seven foot metal pole speared straight at my head and missed by approx. five inches. The sharp pointed pole was speared from the roof top opposite of an open vestibule and flew inside the garage door opening where I was standing. I stood a few feet inside the opening and had moved away from where the pole would have hit my head. It was only a matter of a second. If that pole had hit the side of my head, it would have killed me or certainly maimed me for life. It was an apparent attempt to scare me with the intent to harm. Nonetheless, it could have killed me. Nothing was done to even investigate the incident. Everyone acted either surprised or dumbfounded. The locals knew or had a good idea of who was behind it because gossip travels fast in Trollville. The police didn’t even care and weren’t even interested in taking any action.

Members of the clique in contact with the Colombian were present at work that day and I noticed one of them (South American associated to the local drug network) arrive in the area shortly after the incident happened. He was in direct contact with the Colombian and his family member was one of the heavy drug dealers in town. This particular member had easy access to the roof where the pole was thrown from. It would have taken him a minute to get up there and spear the pole at me and get back to his work station. His work station was in view to my work area so he knew exactly where I was standing.

These guys weren’t the stereo typical gang members or anything like that. They worked, socialized and lived like anyone else in town. However their interactive patterns clearly represented a group that was sustained by a small but integrated network of shady players from neighboring towns. The other unwitting local’s involvement only consisted of narrow-minded favors or greed.

It’s no different than anywhere else where small town dealers get their supplies from more integrated networks. That is a common fact in the world of drug trafficking. It also does not exclude retaliation by these integrated networks of those who choose to expose them.

Because the town was so small, the visibility of their drug activities was well known. Drug use; mostly hashish, amphetamine and steroids was surprisingly higher than one would have expected given the size of the towns in the region. It seemed that these few individuals and their drug activities were openly accepted and had free pass to continue as long as it did not get out of hand. It seemed like the local police really couldn’t do anything about it because they too had their hands tied with political bureaucracy, especially if the locals Colombian had associations to local political members of the left who may have helped him with ‘favors’. They would turn a blind eye to his presence in their town to avoid scandal. Local police could only do something if he was involved in committing a serious felony offense. A few months later local law enforcement did bust local traffickers with a kilo of cocaine which is a nice bust considering the size of the community! The cocaine was hidden inside a van that was the exact match and make of the Colombian’s van. The cocaine bust near the town indicated scouting for opportunities of larger trafficking quantities through the area. The collaborating locals or cliques did not have to know that they were dealing with a small set of connections between the Colombian, Albanians or even the Chechens. The locals probably didn’t care who they were collaborating with or what they were playing part in. As Transparency Norway implied most corruption that occurs in Norway is based on favors for friends or business acquaintances and in this situation this was clearly the case.
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The Clique and the Albanian League

Throughout the west coast of Norway, it is widely known that the Albanian organized crime networks also known as “Leagues” are one of the primary crime groups that traffic most of the narcotics.

Even though few locals accounted for the local distribution network, most of the trafficking, however small the quantity, was controlled by Albanian networks. Everything from cocaine, hashish, heroin and amphetamine, was trafficked by distribution associates of the Albanian league. These distribution associates (assets) are multi-ethnical varying from Norwegian-African-Eastern European and etc. In fact, Albanians are one of the primary traffickers of Afghan heroin through Central Asia, Russia, Turkey, Balkans, Eastern Europe (mainly Bulgaria and Czech Republic) to either Amsterdam or Baltic cities to Scandinavia and then to Norway which is also coordinated with Chechen crime groups.

CIA, DIA and DEA reports concur with national security expert Loretta Napoleoni’s report noting “[IMU-Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan- leader] Namangiani’s networks in Tajikistan and in Central Asia, were used to smuggle opium from Afghanistan. It was partly thanks to Namangiani’s contacts in Chechnya that heroin reached Europe”…. “It was, thanks to the mediation of Chechen criminal groups, that the KLA and the Albanian mafia managed to gain control of the transit of heroin in the Balkans.”[3] These contacts were no doubt Ruslan Saidov’s network due to his close contacts to Uzbekistan’s government, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Hizb ut Tahrir (HuT).

     The Norwegian authorities have long since the 90’s sought a known Albanian criminal tied to the KLA, Princ Dobroshi, as the main man behind the Albanians drug trafficking to Scandinavia and Norway.[4] Princ Dobroshi was regarded as an Albanian crime boss that supplied much of the heroin that found its way to Norway. In 1994, Princ Dobroshi was convicted by Norwegian authorities for smuggling heroin and sentenced to 14 years at the Norwegian maximum security prison, Ullersmo. In 1997, the Albanian league organized and carried out the prison break of Dobroshi. Dobroshi escaped to Croatia and made his way to Prague where he set up his criminal organization. In 1999, Dobroshi was again arrested in Prague, Czech Republic, for arms dealing for the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). [5]

Members of the group in Trollville were both tied to the Albanian network and a Pashtun businessman in Oslo associated to Arfan Bhatti’s gang, Young guns.

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Trollville group & Arfan, the Escape Goat 'Terrorist'

Arfan Bhatti, a Norwegian ethnic Pakistani and former gang member of Young Guns in Oslo, was charged with terrorist plans to target the American embassy and Jewish Mosaic Synagogue in Oslo, Norway.[6] Charges of terrorism were dropped, but he was indicted for shooting at the synagogue. One of his accomplices was a natural born ethnic Norwegian with no anti-Semitic or terrorist background. Bhatti has a long history with violence and gang related activities, especially within extortion. He is another familiar that I came across in the beginning of the 90's as his gang Young Guns was involved in a failed attempt to extort money from an associate of mine that managed a company in Oslo who had asked for my help in the matter. The short lasted threat was resolved without any major complications, and Bhatti and some of the members of the gang ended up with charges related to another extortion case that ‘came to light’ during that time. Bhatti had been charged with stabbing a store owner.

Arfan Bhatti has been described as an Al Qaida leader or member. This is far from the truth. Arfan Bhatti, for those who really know him, was or still is a gangster ‘wanna be’. His irrational antisocial personality sustains the potential for acting out with terrorist acts, but only on his own with a few of his ethnic Norwegian accomplices at his side. He would seek out and volunteer for terrorist acts only because he wants to be known as the meanest and toughest guy on the block or city. Based on his reputation, for him it’s more about making a name or title of fear to be remembered by as either a gangster or terrorist, combined with his rage against western authority rather than any ideological or religious belief.
In 2001, Bhatti had moved to Pakistan while he was on leave during his prison term. When he returned from Pakistan, the Norwegian police apprehended him and returned him to prison so he could serve the rest of his prison sentence. He was released in 2002.

While in Pakistan, he turned to religion and claimed to have become a devout Muslim. It is likely that he met someone in Pakistan that may have recruited him. Early 2006, his fellow gang colleagues from the A-Gang (formerly the Young Guns), was invited to meet the Pakistani President Pervez Musharaf in a closed meeting at the Pakistani Embassy in Oslo, Norway.[7] 

Late 2006, the woman or 'Femme Fatale' from the Trollville group had suddenly contacted a past time friend who was an ethnic Pashtun businessman that formerly owned a bar in Oslo and introduced me to this friend. Her friend had confided that many members of the A-gang (then Young Guns) frequented and used his bar as a front to, as he claimed, sell drugs and conduct other criminal activities. Bhatti was a part of this gang at the time. He added that he had to close his bar/restaurant due to them damaging his reputation. Others in her group that knew him believed he was rotten to the core. Her contact with this businessman was in between the time she played divide and conquer intrigues with the two North African brothers causing them to turn against and threaten each other’s lives. The young man who was considered to be an attractive recruit as a suicide bomber is the son of one of these African brothers. One of the brothers and father to the suicide bomber candidate worked with a company that provides entertainment services to the Nobel Peace prize and concert. See (Hawk of Pandora Volume II Preview)

Arfan Bhatti was associated to Princ Dobroshi while they served in prison together in Norway in the mid 90’s. In 2006, Bhatti was caught in Germany with sketches for an anti tank rocket system, large sums of currencies, religious notes and other weapons manuals in the trunk of his car during the 2006 soccer world cup.[8] German authorities arrested him on suspicion of plans to commit terrorism but were released shortly after. After his release due to lack of evidence he continued on his way to meet Princ Dobroshi in Albania.

German authorities had prevented several terrorist incidents directed at the World Cup as a result of the Muhammed cartoons that had flourished. Small independent cells all across Europe were being gathered up due to the cartoon uproar. This is why the timing the woman from the group that abruptly established contact after many years with the bar owner that catered to Arfan Bhatti’s gang in between her intrigues with the suicide bomber candidates father and uncle made her a clear suspect. That combined with her other friend who was in contact with Surikov’s associates and traveled to a town in the Caucasus when Surikov was there at the same time this became an awfully close and direct communication line to networks interested in recruiting this young man. In 2007, this same recruit was also recruited to a university in England that Surikov’s IPROG organization serves as a steering committee member with this same university. See Engender Burned.

Princ Dobroshi’s arms dealing for the KLA had clear parallels to their Colombian counterparts between the cocaine cartels and FARC. Strengthening and expanding his network with KLA’s muscle would naturally give him more flexibility into heroin and shared cocaine markets in northern Europe. The Kosovo Liberation Army has an alleged relationship to both Chechens and FARC through business partners Yacob Kozman and Davidovich.[9]

Most of the world’s cocaine’s source comes from Colombia followed by Bolivia and Peru. Davidovich (host) and Kozman were allegedly present at Surikov’s meeting in southern France, 1999. Princ Dobroshi and other crime figures, having established trafficking channels to setting up a loose ad hoc network in Scandinavia and Norway would also represent communication channels to these terrorist networks. All it takes is the small favors of unwitting small town dwellers to help make it happen like members of the group and the clique in Trollville.

Drug traffickers are opportunists that constantly look for ways and test potential trafficking routes and markets. They also recruit locals to help. Albanians, Chechens and Colombians are known to be highly resourceful. There have been many instances where Norwegians have taken part in criminal activities without being a part of these organizations.

Whether criminal networks, crony networks and their codes of control and discrimination seem separate, they are always a part of each other.

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The Local Chechens

     With the influx of Chechens fleeing from the war in Chechnya, elements of the Chechen criminal community and former Mujahideen were brought with them. 

In 2007, a video surfaced on YouTube of confessions from a Chechen, Ruslan Khalidov, claiming to be the nephew of the Chechen separatist leader Aslan Maskhadovs’ former bodyguard. In the video, Khalidov confesses that he was requested by pro Moscow authorities in Chechnya to track down and assassinate pro independence Chechen leaders in Norway.[10] One of them lived on the west coast a few hours from Trollville. Khalidov claims that he was pressured, after being tortured, into accepting the task of conducting covert tasks in Norway on behalf of pro-Moscow Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov. Chechen President Kadyrov, in favor of Moscow and Putin, had sent agents to hunt down and kill pro-independence Chechen leaders in Austria, England, Norway and Turkey. One of Khalidov’s tasks was to misinform Norwegian authorities on Chechen expats in Norway. According to Khalidov’s testimony in the video, he was also tasked with assassinating Magomed Ocherhadji, a vocal pro-independence Chechen community leader living in Norway. In the video, Khalidov states that he defied the orders from the pro-Moscow Chechen authorities and is living in hiding.

According to allegations, Ruslan Saidov has maintained high ranking positions within the Chechen leadership switching his allegiance to Kadyrov and later Doku Umarov, Saidov would have been involved with or known about most operations as Brigadier General and chief intelligence advisor to the Chechen separatist leadership. He would also have contacts to many of the former mujahideen that left Chechnya to Europe. Russian military intelligence (GRU) personnel or Russian organized crime often contact expats as assets by coercion using family members who remained in countries in Central Asia or Eastern Europe as collateral hostages. Others still actively operate as assets abroad for criminal networks. 

In Amville, there was a small ad hoc presence of a Chechen clique that expressed clear loyalties to Chechen leaders Ibn al Khattab and Shamil Basaev through their own web page on YouTube where they had numerous Chechen Mujahideen inspirational videos of Basaev and Khattab. Many of the texts also exemplified violent language and threats to Russians they believed were loyal to the pro Moscow Chechen president Kadyrov. One specific threat was an invitation for Russians to come to Amville where they would kill them. Other language pertained to Islam and jihad. There were also plenty of indications including statements from some locals and individuals within the circles to suggest that the Albanians and a few of the Chechens were the major dope connections to their bigger networks in Oslo and other cities. Some of the locals from the clique had connections to these Chechens in Amville. Amville is the same small town where the local convicted felon was caught with two kilograms of explosives less than two months prior to the 2007 Nobel Peace Prize.

Back in the U.S., Cheney had begun picking a fight with Iran and provoking Russia. Various intelligence associations like Veterans Intelligence Professionals for Sanity, the media and investigative reporters like Seymour Hersh supported by former chief U.N. weapons inspector Scott Ritter indicated another déjà vu much like the fabrications of the Iraq war. Neoconservatives had also tried to lay weight on Iranians training Chechen terrorists. They had also spun different angles to trigger a possible invasion of Iran because of the building suspicions of Iran developing nuclear weapons, which seemed to be a clear déjà vu of the invasion of Iraq. Again the neocons seemed to play an important role in setting up false flag contingencies to feed Cheney’s hunger for war. Ruslan Saidov, Anton Surikov and their partner Vladimir Filin seemed to play an important role as partners with Cheney’s former company Halliburton and KBR. It was partners of Filin, Surikov and Saidov that were investigated for selling Ukrainian X55 missiles to Iran. United States and Europe have continuously blamed Iran for seeking to develop nuclear arms. X55 missiles are long range ballistic nuclear missiles. 

In the meantime, the group from Trollville connected to the Surikov and Saidov's network spread their recruiting characteristic intrigues from North Africa to a North African family in Norway that included the suicide bomber candidate and his father who had access to the Nobel Peace Concert.

The Trollville group and clique and environments I describe above as a whole and any involvement with these criminal networks are easily condusive to exploitation for politically corrupt goals by government or corporate elite entities and those who play part in these shady environments allow for the probability of being exploited and leaving an open opportunity for the development of violent groups or 'terrorist groups' under falseflag terms.

As described in the "Abrams Agenda", "How convenient would it be to have a 'terrorist cell' combined with North Africans linked to Iran/Syrian backed Polisario Front with access to the Nobel Peace Prize concert - A lebanese family (vaguely) linked to Iranian backed goups in Southern Lebanon (note: most southern Lebanese have some form of contact with Hezbollah, PFLP-GC or other groups but doesnt make them a terrorist with the exception of Bush doctrine where everyones a terrorist) and a Pakistani tied to a Norwegian born Pakistani 'terrorist' (already indicted for targeting a Jewish synagogue and terrorist plans against the U.S and Israeli Embassy) with ties to a KLA connected crime boss and add a group of Chechen dissidents and former Mujahideen (present in the town where the explosives were uncovered) - also tied to KLA - Al Qaida?"

"Would a terrorist act against a former U.S Vice President and Nobel Peace Prize Concert be enough to trigger war against Iran given Cheney's trigger happy itchy finger moments in 2007 to strike Iran?"

The deceitful, reckless and criminally negligent acts of the Trollville clique and group endangered not only these individuals that were being set up but many others and even at worst case scenario could have triggered war! First World War was started with one shot, the Iraq war was started with fabricated lies and these other wars continue due to direct corruption!
Think before you act!!!


Note: The suicide bomber candidate and his father had no direct or indirect ties to any terrorist group other than the group that were setting them up as terrorists. This group (opportunists) is initially suspected of helping to recruit this kid through thier Baltic contact to Surikov and to a university in England in 2007 which was directly connected to Anton Surikov's organization IPROG. All in all it was clear that the suicide bomber candidate, his father, his uncle and a few others were being set up as escape goats by this group who were involved with contacting and gathering connections that made a Norwegian homegrown terrorist cell seem apparent and imminent.

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[1] THE GROWING THREAT OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME Y 4. J 89/1:104/83 The Growing Threat of International... HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIAREY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION JANUARY 25, 1996 Serial No. 83 pp24

[3] Loretta Napoleoni, Terror Incorporated: Tracing the Dollars Behind the Terror Networks (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2005), pp 90-97

[4] “Released and sent home. The man was previously known as Norway's most dangerous prisoner, Princ Dobroshi, is set free and sent to Kosovo” By Tuva Raanes, Dagbladet (Norwegian edition) fredag 28.01.2005

[5] Ibid

[6] "Bhatti aquitted of terror” by Randi Johannessen,  Knut A. Nygaard and Olav Røli, Aftenposten.no, 3. juni 2008

[7] While others fought to get tickets, criminals from A - gang were invited to a party meeting with Pakistan's president. By Gunnar Hultgreen, Dagbladet Published Wednesday, 25.01.2006

[8] “It is not illegal to have drawings of anti-tank missiles in the car” by KAMILLA THORESEN, Hans-Martin Thømtruud and Sindre Granley Meldalen, Dagbladet.no 

[9] Yasenev's Memo <http://left.ru/burtsev/ops/yasenev_en.phtml>

[10] “Video alleges Moscow policy of assassinating Chechen expats” By Ian Allen, March 9, 2009, intelNews.org.



 




Copyright © 2011 Thomas “Hawk” Hellstrom

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